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Abstract:   
The paper examines the impact of public accountability mechanisms in the Uganda's 
decentralisation local governments. Some of the common tools used for evaluation of local 
government performance have been presented and discussed including the baraza, village 
participatory democracy and the score-card reporting method.  The orthodox theories of local 
governance and concept of democracy are bases for assessing the feasibility of public 
accountability in Uganda. The conclusions of the paper points to inefficiencies are the 
universal applicability of the concept of local democracy leading to a suggestion of new 
mechanisms of public accountability that emerge from organisational learning.   
Key Words: responsiveness, accountability, representation, participation, popular 
authorization, democracy, organisational learning. 
 
Introduction 
Local democracy is an essential practice widely emphasised for increasing accountability of 
government systems. The answerability of public officers and the enforcement of the 
accountability mechanisms are paradoxically core intents and great challenges of local 
governance. The importance of local democracy advocacy therefore lies in the conviction that 
local democracy will enhance local government efficiency through a closer scrutiny of local 
service delivery. The assumption held is that the citizens have the competences for fully 
engaging in democratic governance through elected representatives or by participating directly 
in scrutinising local service delivery. 
Governance whether at the central or local level must be seen to be democratic. Democratic 
governance implies a mandate for governments to create or strengthen mechanisms for public 
participation in decision-making, to abide by the rule of law, to increase transparency in 
public procedures, and to hold officials accountable (Kaufmann et al, 1999).   The case for 
democratic governance aims at providing an institutional framework for participation by all 
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citizens in economic and political processes, and promoting core universal human rights such 
as equality, fairness, justice, information access, and individual freedoms (Cheema, 
2005).Because of its participative nature, democratic governance is considered as a great 
potential for increasing public accountability. Organisational learning is conceived as a 
mechanism for a change – adding to, transforming, or reducing – in organisational knowledge. 
Whilst this concept of organisational learning indicate a multitude interpretation from 
different scholars, this paper considers  current approaches that focus  emphasise routines as 
repositories of knowledge and they conceptualise learning as making and updating of routines 
in response to experiences 
(Levitt and March, 1988).  In this paper the Uganda’s experience in local governance is 
explored. A linkage of the literature which local governance and local democracy to the 
practical tools of public accountability assessing the ideal mechanism of improving service 
delivery local governments 
Methodology 
The paper is based on a detailed documentation and legislation related to local governance and 
a number of reports on service delivery in local governments the public accountability 
mechanism used to assess the delivery. The common public accountability tools evaluated 
include   the score cards, direct/participatory democracy at the village level and the public 
meetings commonly known as barazas
1
.  
Theorising and justifying local governance  
The theoretical background, explores some of the major paradigms that have greatly 
influenced local governance systems. The first set of theories stress the necessity of local 
governments basing on the orthodox propositions dated as far back as the 19
th
 century (Stoker, 
1996). Among the proponents of these theories like John Stuart Mill (1861), Hill (1974), argue 
that local governments aid political participation, ensure efficiency and service delivery and 
oppose an overly centralised government. Their focus largely falls on increased autonomy, 
and creating a multi-purpose institution that provides a wide range of services.  
Gerry Stoker identifies the second strand of theorists – the post-war reformers of the 1950s to 
the 1970s – such as Mackenzie (1961), Panter-Brick (1974), and Sharpe (1970) who stress 
local government’s necessity to allow individuals to voice their needs, and to learn the art of 
practical politics. The reformers also focused on creating a moderate pressure group that 
promotes the un-organised interests for young people, women, and other marginalised social 
groups. It further aims to respond to the rising demand for public services by offering a more 
controlled and planned service delivery and a counterweight to the power of professionals the 
public services in their interests rather than society interests (King and Stoker, 1996:7-8). 
                                                          
1 This term is  explained in detail  under the tools of accountability in the  latter section of this paper 
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Yet, Stoker’s third strand of theorists includes commentators like Jones and Stewart (1985) 
who commend local government systems for their scope of local autonomy and decision-
making and as essential units for ensuring that resources are better matched with the diversity 
of the local needs. This third strand seems to hold a more relevant to arguments in this paper, 
and suggests overtime, local governments became more desirable because of not only their 
potential to enhance participation but also to disperse political power to the communities to 
enable political choice and ensure proper resource utilisation. Local governments thus 
constitute a visible local bureaucracy, controlled by councilors who work closely with the 
technical officials and who are involved in the affairs of their locality. This increases 
opportunities for accountability and responsiveness. 
Democracy and public accountability  
The modern notion of democracy  is rooted in the classical conception of  ancient Greece 
philosophy of  “rule by  demos (many)” an idea influenced by the philosophy of Aristotle (as 
early as 300BC)  who attempted to classify   governments  on the basis of who rules and who 
benefits  from the rule. Aristotle’s philosophical conclusion based on this view was that 
governments may be in the hands of single individuals (tyranny/monarchy), a small group 
(oligarchy/aristocracy) or in the hands of many (democracy/polity). While Aristotle   
acknowledged that in any of these governments category can be conducted to the interest of 
the rulers or to the benefit of the community, polity was comparatively considered to be better 
than a monarchy and aristocracy (Heywood 1994:69-70) 
In its classical conception, the Athenian democracy was a direct/participatory democracy – a 
form of government by mass meetings and with each citizen qualified to hold a political office 
by lot or rota (Heywood, 2004:224).  It was therefore characterised by citizen’s popular 
control through direct deliberations and by equal participation of where all citizens were 
eligible for holding political office.  Whilst direct democracy may be an admirable ancient 
Greece governance model, the modern government operating within a great society 
complexity permits less of direct democracy that was feasible with smaller communities. As 
such indirect/ representative democracy in which popular participation is through the act of 
voting is the most dominant. Representative democracy, Heywood observes, is not only 
infrequent and brief because of the term limit but also keeps the public at arm’s length from 
the government by choosing representatives to govern on their behalf. 
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The Athenian and indeed Aristotelian theory of democracy has widely influenced subsequent 
and scholarly readership conceptual interpretations. Among others, this paper borrows ideas of   
David Beetham that re-emphasise the classical thoughts on democracy through two 
categorical principles of popular control and political equality (Beetham in King and Stoker 
1996:31-32) Beetham’s emphasis is that popular control is characterised by popular 
authorisation of the key government decision makers through election by universal equal 
suffrage. Under such authorisation, the people constitute the rightful source of political 
authority (what he conceives as popular sovereignty). These mechanisms to Beetham should 
be aided by a written constitution that has been directly approved by popular vote whose 
change can only be through a referendum. The underlying assumption here is that since the 
rightful source of political authority   lies in the people, they should then have a final say on 
the constitutional terms on which that authority is surrendered to others.  
Popular authorisation is then seen as a mechanism for holding the representatives accountable 
for the policies and actions undertaken while in office and in the event of failure or abuse of 
trust by these representatives that should be turned out of office through the electoral process. 
Beyond the accountable representatives however, it is also assumed that popular control 
should enable a responsive government – of a pluralistic nature – that takes into account a full 
range of public opinion obtained by consultation for the formulation and implementation of 
law and policy. 
Beetham’s second principle of political equality and equal citizenship on the other hand 
constitutes such arguments as equal vote value for all, equal opportunities to stand for a public 
office for all social groups, and equal access to media. The general view under this democratic 
principle relates to fairness for all sections of the society and their opinions.  
The above views on democracy are critical and informative in understanding how public 
accountability may be realised in the local in governments. Both direct and representative 
democracy if well practiced can enable not only a responsive government but also accountable 
leaders that are mindful of the wishes of those who authorise them and their power to 
withdraw their mandate in case of failure and mistrust of the representatives and the 
government in the service delivery. It remains important however to assess the possibilities of 
translation of such theory of popular control and political equality into realities of different 
international,  national and local contexts given that the political, economic, social and 
technical empowerment of  citizens may be paramount determinants in the use of  these 
principles.  
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Conceptualisation of public accountability  
Overall conceptualisation of public accountability framework includes three facets: political, 
administrative and social accountability as illustrated in Figure 1 below:  
Figure 1: A framework for Local governance   and public Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source. Adopted and modified from Yilmaz, et al (2008): Local Government Discretion and 
Accountability: A Diagnostic Framework for Local Governance 
 
 
The framework in Figure 1 above is a modification the conceptual framework for analyzing 
the factors that improve local governance put forward by Yilmaz et al (2008). Political, 
administrative, and fiscal accountability are essential elements contributing to realisation of 
local government outcomes of sustainable service delivery, such as increased local control   of 
development planning and decision making, and strengthened accountability through citizens 
monitoring. Relating to the core argument of this paper, community driven/social 
accountability approaches are indicated as most critical in ensuring the desirable attainment 
the local government outcomes.  
 
Political accountability 
- Local council oversight 
- Electoral accountability 
measures (recalls, write-
ins, independent 
candidates) 
 
Financial accountability 
- Local public financial 
management (Planning, 
budgeting, internal control 
audit, and external audit 
 
Administrative 
accountability 
-Bureaucratic hierarchy, 
civil service rules & 
regulations, Procedural 
practices  
Local Government Outcomes 
 Responsive, effective and sustainable services  
 Enhanced political, Financial, and administrative 
accountability 
 Greater local control of development, planning and 
decision making 
 Strengthening accountability through greater citizen 
monitoring  
Community Driven /Social Accountability Approaches 
 Participatory Planning, budgeting, expenditure 
tracking  
 Participatory monitoring, and management of 
investment projects 
 Citizen access to information 
 Citizens feedback services (reports, social audits) 
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Local democracy in Uganda and its influence on accountability 
Whist local governance in Uganda dates back to the pre-colonial and the colonial era, the 
current agenda of decentralisation and local democracy started in the mid-1980s when the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power and set up Resistance councils (now called 
local councils)(MOLG, 2006). During the following years, local governments and local 
council units were modified by the extended legal framework of the Local Government 
Statute of 1993, the Uganda Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1997 (CAP 243). 
Effecting local democracy was meant to be achieved through political decentralisation. 
Uganda’s intensified policy of decentralisation was seen as a cornerstone for improving 
service delivery and strengthening good governance especially at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Over the years, government has sought to address the deficiencies in public service delivery at 
the local level by strengthening central government monitoring programs. Such   monitoring is 
often done through monitoring units and inspectorates in central government ministries, public 
accounts committees of Parliament, constitutional and statutory accountability bodies, local 
accountability committees and more recently administrative initiatives such as barazas, task 
forces and other forces of inquiries. Government driven performance monitoring initiatives 
are complemented by a wide range of initiatives by civil society organisations
2
 
 
Ugandan local governance: - a political and administrative web 
The Ugandan local governance system consists of a complex structure, with a broad 
geographical rural-urban classification, and different hierarchies of local government 
organisations in rural and urban areas (Table 1): 
Table 1: Local Government Structures in Uganda 
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE  UNITS CLASSIFICATION BY LEVEL 
 
 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
 Local Gov’t Higher  Local 
Government 
Lower Local 
Government 
Administrative  
Units 
Rural District District Council 
(LC5) 
Sub-County (LC3)  LC1(Village) 
LC2 (Parish) 
LC4 (County) 
Rural-
Urban 
  Town Councils 
(LC3) 
LC1 (Village) 
LC2 (Ward) 
Urban City City Council (LC5) City Division 
Council (LC3) 
LC1 (Village) 
LC2 (Parish) 
Municipal  Municipal Division 
(LC3) 
LC1 (Village) 
LC2 (Parish) 
Source: Local Governments Act, CAP 243: Sec. 3& 45 
                                                          
2One example of   such  organisations  is  the Uganda Debt Network (UDN),  that has been  undertaking a series of 
community level monitoring and evaluation  of government programs through  using a range of tools including 
Community-based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (CBMES)  
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As highlighted in Table 1, Uganda's comprehensive local government system is made of a 
five-tier pyramidal structure of local councils (LCs). These local councils are classified as 
rural councils and urban councils.  They are also classified as local government and 
administrative units (Uganda, 1997 Sec 3). 
Within the in rural areas a five tier system consists of: 
 the Village (LC1), 
 Parish (LC2), 
 Sub-County (LC3),  
 County (LC4), and 
 District (LC5).  
In urban areas this consists of: 
 the Village (LC1),  
 Ward or Parish (LC2),  
 Municipal Division, and City Division (LC3),  
 Municipality (LC4), and  
 City (LC5). 
Urban-Rural structures consists of town councils (equivalent to sub counties) in a purely rural 
setting and Town boards which are classified rural-emerging trading centres   
The legislation classifies a village, a parish/ward and a county as administrative units which 
exist for purposes of aiding administration of local governments through provision of advice 
on matters pertaining the respective administrative unit level and monitoring delivery of 
services in the area of jurisdiction among other roles. 
Local government and representative democracy  
The present local government councils comprise a chairperson (or a mayor in a city) and one 
councillor for each electoral ward.  Local government representation thus is through single 
member constituencies. An electoral area of a district council is a sub-county whilst in the 
municipal council councillors represent parishes/wards. In addition however, the local 
councils consist of other councillors that include: 2 youth councillors (1 male and 1female); 2 
councillors with disabilities, (1 male and 1 female); and women councillors that form one-
third these councils
3
 (LGA 1997: Sec 10 & 23).Local governments also include executive 
committees with a chairperson, vice chairperson and up to three secretaries of whom at least 
one must be a female (Sec 16 and 25 of the Act). The Local Governments Act also mandates 
these councils to select a speaker, a deputy speaker and at most three Standing Committee 
chairpersons from amongst the councillors irrespective of gender. The impact on the entire 
local government electoral process by the multi-party dispensation that came into effect in 
2006 seems to be insignificant taking into account that the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) ruling party is the majority party that dominated the grassroots democracy. Party 
politics can therefore be said to be insignificant especially in rural areas.  
                                                          
3The other mentioned categories form two thirds of the council 
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The higher tier of local government administrations, through their leadership – 
chairperson/mayor, vice chairperson, and a number of secretaries
4
 – are charged with 
responsibility of initiating and formulating policy, overseeing the implementation of the 
government and council policies, monitoring and coordinating the activities of the council and 
the NGOs operating within the local government, and recommending persons to be appointed 
on council commissions and boards. The leadership is also responsible for solving disputes 
referred by lower local government councils and the evaluation of council plans and programs 
(LGA 1997: Sec 18 & 26). Lower tiers of local government, including municipalities, are also 
charged with maintaining law, order and security; initiating and supporting self-help projects; 
and linking the government and local people (Kyohairwe 2009).  
The composition of administrative units however differs modestly from that of local 
governments. Whilst the Local government councils consist of representatives selected 
directly from electoral areas by adult suffrage the administrative unit councils, with the 
exception of village council, are constituted of executive members of immediate lower 
councils. Village councils include all persons of 18-years of age or above in that village from 
whom the village selects a 10-member executive committee. Parish administrative units (or 
wards in towns) are made up of all members of the village executive committees within that 
parish, while at a county administrative unit comprises all members of the sub-county 
executive committees within that county. Like the village level, at the parish administrative 
council, consists of a ten-member committee selected amongst the council members.  
Although the county administrative unit council consists of the sub-county executive 
committees, it is only mandated to select a chairperson and vice chairperson but, unlike other 
of administrative units, has no other committees (LGA 1997). The functions of the 
administrative units include monitoring of services, assisting in maintaining law and order and 
highlighting to the political or administrative staff any matter that raises their concern. The 
County AU is further responsible for advising the area Members of Parliament on all matters 
pertaining to the county and is also charged with resolving problems or disputes referred to 
them by relevant sub-counties. Aparish AU is also responsible for resolving disputes within 
village councils. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Local government political secretaries are a.k.a Ministers  in charge of respective sectors 
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Tools for public accountability under Uganda’s local democracy  
 Participatory democracy through Local councils 
For over two decades, participatory democracy has been used as a tool of local democracy in 
Uganda especially at the in village (LC1). Membership of the village includes all persons of 
18 year of age or above residing in the area. Through its executive committee  of ten elected 
members (LGA 1997, Sec 47(2) the village is responsible for duties such as maintaining law 
and order, initiation and participation in self-help projects, and serves as a communication 
channel between higher local councils and the people in the area. It is also charged with 
monitoring administration and the projects in its area. These functions imply that the villages 
have significant responsibility in ensuring accountability in the service delivery within the 
localities. The decision making at the lowest local council is normally affected through regular 
meetings on the matters that affect respective communities at this level. Many times, because 
of the relatively small size of the villages, decisions are taken through participatory manner, 
where all members attend meetings and contribute to political debates as shown in figure 2 
below. 
Participatory democracy as illustrated above is one popular form of enhancing accountability 
and responsiveness since the people in need of service delivery are directly involved in the 
making critical decisions related to such services. Through direct democracy, all members of 
the village (through adult suffrage) vote for their executive representatives. Once elected, the 
village members hold regular meetings with their representatives on matters affecting their 
respective villages. The constitution and Local Government Act (CAP 243 Section 47) give 
the village members a mandate to remove a chairperson or a member of a village executive 
committee if such executive member is incompetent, corrupt, abuses office or has other 
misconduct that is affect the   performance of such a member as per the wishes of the people.  
We realise that this is consistent with the principle of popular control theorised in David 
Beetham’s scholarly work. Ideally the village participatory democracy further offers an 
opportunity to all people at the village level opportunities of political equality in decision 
making and a relatively equal voice for holding their leaders accountable. These assumptions 
of popular control and political equality not withstanding though, it may quickly be noted that 
it is more theoretically conceived than practically feasible for village members to effectively 
hold their leaders accountable. This may be in the event that local people may be incapacitated 
– have limited knowledge in governance matters, less interest in political issues, less power in 
voicing their concerns – to the extent they are often easily manipulated, coerced or ignored by 
their leaders who instead keep serving their own wishes than those of the represented with 
immunity facilitated by the democratic failures in larger governance system structures.  
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 The Baraza Tool for Public Engagement in Local Democracy and Accountability 
First adopted in 2009, the barazas
5
are a Presidential initiative to create space for citizens 
discussion and evaluation of the performance of government programs within their respective 
communities. The term baraza in Uganda is applicable to are sub-county fora/dialogues where 
local people hold Government officials, especially at Local Government level, to account for 
the resources spent on public programmes in their areas - normally held bi-annually. 
At its inception, the baraza process was piloted in 10 districts and by August 2012, it had been 
rolled out to about 68 districts with plans to cover the whole country in the next three years. 
The baraza is conducted twice a year at the sub-county level and is spearheaded by the Office 
of the Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) – presidential representative – at the district 
level in their respective districts. At the national level, the barazas initiative is run by the 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and monitored by its department of Monitoring and 
Evaluation of the OPM office (OPM 2011). Barazas according to the OPM are designed to 
empower communities and citizens to demand better service delivery and accountability,; and 
improving information and communication about government programs and projects. The 
program was further intended to identify policy and implementation challenges that affect the 
government’s performance management system. The process is intended to provide 
meaningful recommendations to government on measures to improve service delivery and 
reactivate the supervision and monitoring functions of RDCs. 
The barazas bring together stakeholders from central and local governments, service 
providers or bureaucrats, and the public/community - the users of services, and provide an 
opportunity for sharing public information with local communities. It is focused on effective 
monitoring of public service provision and gives an arena for the community to demand for 
accountability from bureaucrats. The baraza meetings are characterised by four identifiable 
aspects that involve assessment of the following  
 the planned services for the community;  
 what was actually delivered;  
 what was actually spent on different locations; and  
 the issues and challenges have emerged  with proposals of the way forward. 
The entire process is therefore aimed at improving civic participation and public 
accountability with a focus on critical sectors including Agriculture (especially regarding the 
National Agriculture Advisory Services program) education, water and sanitation, health and 
roads (OPM 2011) 
                                                          
5Baraza(s)is Kiswahili  language word meaning a public meeting, which is used as a platform for creating 
awareness, responding to issues affecting a given community, sharing vital information, providing citizens with the 
opportunity to identify and propose solutions to concerns. 
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 The barazas accountability performance has been felt in some areas. Some reports from the 
office of Prime minister indicate achievements that have been realised in some of the districts.  
Two of the districts in the report include Lira and Amaru Districts in Northern Uganda. In Lira 
District, the community barazas reports available largely focus on challenges of effective 
access to justice highlighting the public dissatisfaction with inadequacies in handling of court 
cases and related records by the police and the judiciary (http://justicecentres.go.ug/). A 
detailed account of service delivery baraza report however is from Amuru district. In two of 
the subcounties of Amuru district where the barazas were held, the residents took the 
opportunity to critique and demand explanation for government programs and funds they felt 
were inappropriately spent including road construction, the Northern Uganda Social Action 
Fund (NUSAF), National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and Peace Recovery and 
Development Plan (PRDP). Assessing the National Agricultural Advisory Services, the public 
is noted to have raised extreme concerns that the project implementers were distributing pigs 
“as small as edible rats” and yet they exaggerate the prices to the tune of 300,000 Uganda 
shillings. In education, the local people also demanded to know why some schools were 
charging extra fees on top of the funds disbursed for Universal Primary Education, while in 
the roads sector,  the state of the roads in the district  was critically considered  not be 
reflective the existing government personnel and financial releases  in this sector. Overall 
however several members of the community expressed excitement at the initiative of 
empowering them to demand accountability from the government workers (IRN News of 24th 
August 2011, OPM 2012). 
The baraza reports in both Districts indicate that the local community is active in 
pursuing accountability of public servants though mechanisms of participation in 
the evaluation of community programs. The critique of  community  engagement 
through barazas however  is that most  local people  involved in the barazas, 
including district leaders  have limited factual information on  matters being  
raised  which limits their efficiency  in their discussions  with their political and 
bureaucratic  leaders  appropriately. Other hiccups highlighted in the use of 
baraza tool  is also considered as the timing – in the morning hours - that usually 
proves problematic for public attendance because many people are at work. The 
venue of barazas being at SubCounty headquarters is also distant and 
inconvenient for some community members that would like to attend. These 
hindrances of course, imply a subsequent effect on the input of the public and are 
clear indicators of limited popular control and political equality of all the 
community members as it ought to be under a proper local democracy, at least 
according to David Beetham’s view. 
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a) Score-cards reports and local democracy 
The score-card was a tool developed by the Advocates Coalition for Development and 
Environment (ACODE) to deepen decentralisation and the delivery of effective governance 
and quality goods and services. The reports provide an assessment of local government 
councils, chairpersons, speakers and councilors to determine how well they perform their 
political responsibilities and functions, although this paper focuses on overall local 
government council performance. The council performance assessment criteria include 
legislative representation, accountability to citizens, planning and budgeting, and monitoring 
of service delivery in different sectors. The delivery of the services in the different sectors 
within the districts is another performance criteria. This paper presents two case studies of 
Mpigi and Luwero districts in central Uganda in which the score-card tool was used to enable 
a further analytical stance of the tool relevance in service delivery.  
Luwero and Mpigi are two of the 20 district local councils that were assessed using the Local 
Government Councils’ Score-card in 2009/10. The summaries in Cases 1 and 2 are reports 
derived from score-cards completed by local community participants. The findings are 
summarised below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kyohairwe                                                           Public accountability in Uganda 
98 
CJLG June 2014 
Case 1: Score-card reports for Luwero District 
Legislative Representation:Scored 17 out of 25. The district council conducted business in 
accordance with the rules of procedure. The council passed a number of motions on service 
delivery, accountability and other relevant areas;  received and handled petitions and letters 
submitted to it by the electorate. However it performed poorly in holding public hearings. 
Accountability to citizens: scored 21 out of 25 points. The council maintained the practice 
of displaying public funds and ongoing projects on public notice boards. The display of 
funds was common at both the district as well as sub-county The display of funds was 
common at both the district as well as sub-county headquarters. The systems to ensure 
administrative accountability - issues of Audit and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
reports were in place. 
Planning and budgeting: scored 16 out of 25 points. The district local government relied 
heavily on central government conditional grants to finance its budget. Yet, to be effective, 
the council must have the independence and autonomy to budget and allocate resources. 
The Council had approved all the basic budget and planning instruments including the 
district budget framework paper, the three-year district development plan, the district 
capacity building plan, the district revenue enhancement plan, and the district work plan. 
Although there were reported initiatives by council to raise local revenue and engage central 
government on revenue enhancement there was no substantial increase in local revenue or 
discretionary funding which would increase the planning and budgeting autonomy of the 
council. 
Monitoring Public service delivery: scored 21 out of 25 points.  The district council had 
quarterly report for every visit to monitor the delivery of National Priority Program Areas 
(indicated in the council minutes).  It managed to fulfill the Constitutional role of overseer 
or  local government employee performance  in provision of  services  and monitor the 
provision of government services or the implementation of projects in their areas as 
provided for  under Article 176(2) (g) of the Constitution. 
Overall assessment in service delivery in different Sectors: In Education sector, the 
intake increased from 86.8% in 2007 to 118.3 in 2009. The number of pupils Primary 
leaving Exams (PLE) passing in Division 1 declined from 16.4 in 2003  to 7.4% in 2009. 
There were challenges of the poor classroom infrastructure in many of the schools in the 
district characterised by dilapidated and at times incomplete structures.  
In health, access to medical services remained a challenge due to few health units and 
medical workers. Improvement in some areas like availability of HIV services (37% in 2006 
to 93% in 2009)  were registered but there were some declines in other areas such as  
immunisation and health service utilisation. Bad conduct of the health workers, manifested 
in the high levels of absenteeism and negligence towards patients.  
The access  of water services in the district was at 75% while functionality of the water 
sources was at 80% for the rural areas.  The provisions of  to clean water had not improved 
though, for the majority of local residents.  
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Case 2: Findings of Mpigi District 
Legislative Representation: scored 11 out of 25. For three years, the district council 
conducted business without following any rules of procedure, did not enact any ordinances 
during the year under review, and never held the meetings on time. It performed poorly in 
holding public hearings. 
Accountability to citizens: scored 19 out of 25. It had an established practice of displaying 
public funds and ongoing projects on public notice boards. The display of funds was 
common at both the district as well as sub-county headquarters. In terms of political 
accountability, the district council chambers had a provision for a citizens’ gallery and the 
council allows citizens to observe council sessions and make contributions. Council 
accorded ample time for the discussion of all sectoral committee reports. 
Planning and Budgeting: scored 13 out of 25. It relied heavily on central government 
conditional grants to finance its budget. Yet, to be effective, but can do well with the 
independence and autonomy of the budget and allocation of  resources. The council had 
approved all the basic budget and planning instruments: the district budget framework 
paper, the three-year district development plan; the district capacity building plan; the 
district revenue enhancement plan and the district work plan. Although there were reported 
initiatives by council to raise local revenue and engage central government on revenue 
enhancement, there was no substantial increase in local revenue or discretionary funding 
which would increase the planning and budgeting autonomy for the council 
Monitoring public service delivery: District Council obtained Maximum score in 
overseeing the performance of persons employed by the government in service delivery. 
The Council sectoral committees undertook regular monitoring, and produced regular 
reports. The council’s deliberations had  substantial discussions on a number of service 
delivery issues, with commitment to follow up emerging issues 
Overall assessment in service delivery in different Sectors:  
In education sector, Enrolment percentages had risen from 42.7 per cent in 2007 to 69.7 per 
cent in 2009; and there were constant pupil-teacher ratio over the previous 5 years . The 
primary leaving examination had a major slump in performance over the years with  a drop 
in Division One – from 6.9 in 2003 to less than  2% in 2008  
Health facilities were few,  with an average distance to a health facility in the district is 7 
km while the doctor-to-population ratio stands at  about 1:41,023. Infant mortality ratio is 
97 per 10,000 live births. 
Major sources of water in the district were piped distribution networks in the urban areas 
and protected springs in the rural areas.  79% of the urban and 81% of the rural population 
access clean water sources. The functionality of these water sources, especially shallow 
wells in the rural areas presents a particular challenge, with 252 sources (33%) being non-
functional  
Source: Muyomba-Tamale, L., et al. (2011). Local Government Councils’ Performance and Public 
Service Delivery in Uganda: Mpigi  and Luwero District Council Score-Card Reports 2009/10.  
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Construing the council score-cards reports 
Legislative representation was found to be relatively poor in Mpigi and moderate in Luwero. 
This implied that the representatives were not effectively representing their electorates since 
in some instances they never followed rules and regulations and never involved people in 
public hearings that are critical mechanisms of enforcing public accountability. The overall 
observation was that there was limited popular control and as a result public accountability 
might have been compromised. 
On contrary however, direct indicators of financial accountability to citizens seemed to have 
scored slightly higher as was illustrated by open publicity of the funds obtained by the districts 
and sub-counties. The study report also highlighted the transparency of councils that provided 
a citizens’ gallery during council deliberations. Administrative accountability could be 
deduced from audit and public accounts committee reports. 
The responses on planning and budgeting in both districts however suggested little influence 
from councilor’s or citizens in ensuring local accountability. While it is true that councils do 
engage in the planning and budgeting process and oversight functions, the pathetic realities 
that impinge their accountability stem from limited financial autonomy from the central 
government, and lack of control over use of funds. The center dictates budgetary priorities 
which contradicts the assumptions for democratic decentralisation and local governance that 
assumes local prioritisation of needs.  
On the monitoring of public services, the scores were admirable indicating that both district 
councils were highly involved in the regular monitoring the government programs.  The 
follow-up by councilors, on the activity by local government bureaucrats demonstrate 
possibilities of enhanced financial accountability in the service delivery. Such monitoring is 
meant to establish the performance progress and quality to demonstrate administrative 
accountability.  
A final analysis of the performance score-cards indicates persistent problems across the 
sectors of education, health and water which are meant to address critical social needs. A 
decline in pupil enrolment rates and academic performance in PLE, persistent health facilities 
and resources plus limited water access by the rural poor are clear indications of the 
controversies in the orthodox assumptions relating to the local democracy and 
decentralisation.  
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The findings in this sector suggest that not every local democracy leads to responsive and 
accountable actions of the political leaders; and that perhaps a scrutiny of other systemic 
factors for improved service delivery may override local democracy thinking for improved 
service delivery.  Indeed dilemmas of decentralisation, local democracy, and service in 
Uganda for over two decades in Uganda can be detected in such illustrations as below:  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The score-card tool and the related reports presented above indicate that if well used the tool 
can solicit and raise issues of performance in the local government. This assessment if done 
by the local people is likely to offer an opportunity to them for obtaining information and 
raising matters of concern to which local government leaders can direct attention. This 
suggests that there is a likelihood of public accountability realisation as a result. We should 
appreciate however that the tool may require a relatively higher level of knowledge, 
information and analytical thinking which may disadvantage the local people with low 
education and less capacities to assess the given parameters of district performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Left: A community “ambulance” (a locally made stretcher) commonly used in some remote places in 
Uganda to transport patients and pregnant mothers to health facilities.(source: 
http://wrauganda.blogspot.com/2013/11/unreliable-referral-system-make-poor.html).  
Right: A resident drawing contaminated water in one of the villages in Luwero 
Source:  ACODE Digital Library, in Muyomba-Tamale, 2011 
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Conclusion and recommendations 
Public accountability is closely linked to local democracy both in theory and practice. Local 
governance largely influenced by orthodox assumptions of efficiency and effectiveness in 
service delivery and as a way of increasing participation has been extensively adopted in 
Uganda since 1980s. Influenced by Athenian and Aristotelian theory of democracy and the 
views of the subsequent scholars in democratic governance (such as David Beetham) 
decentralisation and local governance has been adapted aiming at increasing public 
accountability. 
Uganda’s search for public accountability has been associated with   community driven social 
accountability approaches that  among many other tools has  implemented participatory 
democracy especially at the village level, baraza public meetings for  public expenditure and 
service delivery  assessment, and  scorecard reports for performance evaluation. The 
involvement of citizens at the grassroots in these government performance assessments 
undoubtedly is a direct way of ensuring public accountability.  Controversies of effective 
public accountabilities remain persistent for such challenges associated with the limited 
empowerment of the majority of the citizens involved in the participation process for 
government performance evaluation. Observations relating to limited information and 
knowledge on the subject being assessed, as well as economic vulnerability due to poverty 
that subjects them to being manipulated which affects objectivity, poor timing of participatory 
assessment schedules and inaccessible venues for participation are great hindrances to equal 
involvement of all citizens. Consequently popular control and political equality principles of 
democracy as suggested in Beetham remain elusive in the Ugandan context.  The suggestion 
for improving public accountability from this paper is that instead of   increasingly initiating 
additional mechanisms of involving the masses in public accountability, it is important to 
assess and   learn from our own routines and experiences – as suggested in social 
organisational learning. This will enable us to assess the extent of citizen’s ability to control 
the actions of their representatives and to influence the responsiveness of the government. In 
the event that personalised efforts of citizens may not influence public accountability, 
mechanisms for enhancing concerted efforts of civil societies may be a comparative option. 
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